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Corporate governance research focuses on 
disciplining managerial behaviour under the 
circumstances of the separation of ownership and 
control where the firms‟ owners delegate 
the managers with control powers over their wealth 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Grounded within agency 
theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), corporate 
governance research addresses the potential 
conflicts between the shareholders and the 
management where managerial discretion 
constitutes one of its central concepts (Haj Youssef 
& Teng, 2019). This paper aims to demonstrate show 
the importance of managerial discretion and 
endeavour to provide an answer for the following 
question: Does managerial discretion remain 
an important research domain within corporate 
governance disciplines? 
Andersen (2017, 2019) suggests corporate 
governance research should abandon the concept of 
managerial discretion because extant research only 
focuses on the concept of managerial discretion 
rather than its antecedents and consequences. 
In fact, two separate sections describing the 
antecedents and consequences of managerial 
discretion were featured in Andersen‟s (2017) study. 
On the antecedents, Andersen (2017) discusses two 
examples of discretion antecedents, locus of control 
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Our study aims to demonstrate the importance of managerial 
discretion to corporate governance research and deepen our 
understanding of managerial discretion. Adopting theoretical 
frameworks and definitions from 93 conceptual and empirical 
studies on managerial discretion and corporate governance, 
we argue that extant studies have presented explicit empirical 
and theoretical definitions of managerial discretion; and have 
proved the validity, reliability, and replicability of the concept. 
We argue that corporate governance scholarship cannot move 
forward without managerial discretion as it provides 
shareholders and board of directors‟ essential guidance on how 
much freedom in decision-making is to be granted to top 
managers by deeming the different dimensions of the internal 
and external environment into consideration. We reinstate our 
original argument that corporate governance research is not 
better off without managerial discretion. We also provide a new 
vantage for corporate governance and managerial discretion 
scholars to distinguishing between the latitude of actions and 
latitude of objectives. 
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arguing that due to the lack of support for human-
related factors affecting managerial discretion, there 
is a need to develop more complete assessments of 
the construct. Furthermore, Andersen (2019) claims 
that studies cannot conduct empirical work because 
the concept itself is not measured. However, 
Haj Youssef and Teng (2019) contend that several 
studies as shown in Wangrow, Schepker, and 
Barker‟s (2015) review, attempted to directly 
operationalize the construct of discretion. For 
instance, Carpenter and Golden (1997) measured 
discretion by directly asking executives about their 
perception of their own level of discretion. 
Additionally, Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) 
directly measured discretion by gathering data from 
two groups of experts: scholars and security 
analysts. Crossland and Hambrick (2011) departed 
from the same position where they measured 
national discretion level using two expert panels: 
academics and fund managers. More recently, 
Crossland and Chen (2013) also used the country 
discretion scores generated by Crossland and 
Hambrick (2011) in their study to investigate the role 
of discretion in assessing CEOs‟ accountability for 
poor performance in various countries. Similarly, 
Haj Youssef, Hussein, and Awada (2019) directly 
measured the degree of managerial discretion by 
using an expert panel consisting of consultants 
and strategic management scholars. This method 
provides construct validity and shows that such 
operationalisation technique is useful to understand 
the degree of discretion that is accorded to 
executives. 
On the consequences, Andersen (2017) limited 
his discussion to very few outcomes of managerial 
discretion while reinforcing the idea that discretion 
is not used as a dependent variable instead of as 
a moderator. He argues that managers need to 
determine which actions fall within their discretion 
set, referring to the individual dimension of 
discretion. However, Abrahamson and Hambrick 
(1997) demonstrate that industries with greater 
discretion negatively affect executives‟ attentional 
homogeneity. The greater the industry discretion, 
the higher the heterogeneity in executives‟ 
cognitions. This helps executives to pay attention to 
external challenges and broadens their array of 
actions. For instance, when industry regulations are 
lifted, allowing more discretion, executives become 
more efficient in their selection of appropriate 
strategies, which helps to acquire more dynamic 
capabilities to achieve better adaptation to 
organisational change (Peteraf & Reed, 2007). 
Neglecting the fact that executives and particularly 
CEOs matter, Andersen (2017, 2019) was led to 
believe that no scientific support is presented to 
show that executives have an impact on 
organisational performance. Since Lieberson and 
O‟Connor (1972), researchers have been interested in 
studying and empirically testing the executive, 
particularly CEO, the effect on firm performance and 
how much of that performance can be attributable 
to the individual CEO (Jain & Jamali, 2016; Hadani, 
Dahan, & Doh, 2015; Quigley & Hambrick, 2015; 
Wangrow et al., 2015). While acknowledging that 
executives have much influence on their firms‟ 
outcomes, there is also recognition that their 
behaviour is constrained by other factors (internal 
and external) that hinder their effectiveness. For 
instance, Crossland and Hambrick (2007) use a large 
data set spanning more than 15 years and variance 
partitioning technique to isolate the variance in firm 
performance attributable to CEO as opposed to 
other contextual factors. They find that the CEO with 
greater discretion has a 13 per cent direct effect on 
firm performance as opposed to year (4 per cent), 
industry (12 per cent), company (19 per cent), and 
52 per cent of the unexplained source. Also, 
Crossland and Hambrick (2011) empirically showed 
that managerial discretion is strongly associated 
with the individual CEO effect on firm performance. 
Furthermore, Quigley and Hambrick (2015) 
empirically tested the increased effect of CEO on 
firm performance on a sample of US publicly listed 
firms and showed that the CEO effect has increased 
substantially and that it has reached almost 
20 per cent, which is attributable to individual CEO. 
Similarly, Quigley and Graffin (2017) reaffirmed 
the significance of the CEO effect and reported 
a 21.8 per cent of direct CEO effect on firm 
performance, much higher than other factors. 
Therefore, the CEO effect on firm performance exists 
in proportion to the degree of managerial discretion, 
and that the discretion construct is an important 
mediator between the external environment and 
the CEO effect on firm performance. 
Not only Andersen (2019) deems that 
managerial discretion dimensions have been neither 
theoretically nor empirically defined, but also 
considers the study of Haj Youssef and 
Christodoulou (2017a) adding new dimensions to 
the construct. This apparently shows that Andersen 
did not carefully read the studies mentioned and 
instead relied on virtual assumptions to support his 
reasoning. Andersen (2019) says: “This dimension is 
called cultural environment despite the fact that it 
includes organizational culture, which is an internal 
rather than an environment dimension” (p. 194). 
The cultural dimensions used in Haj Youssef and 
Christodoulou (2017a) were clearly at the national 
level and the study did not mentioned or 
incorporate any organisational level variables. They 
solely focused on the informal institutional 
environment as suggested by Crossland and 
Hambrick (2011). Thus, Andersen arguing that these 
additions should give us a pause to assess whether 
there is a need to add dimension is a misleading 
statement. We agree that there should be a clear 
distinction between the latitude of actions granted 
to executives and the freedom the executive actually 
implements or uses. Reinforcing the argument 
presented by Abrahamson and Hambrick (1997) on 
the executive attentional pattern and its relationship 
with managerial discretion. However, this does not 
reduce the importance of managerial discretion in 
the corporate governance field; instead, it shows that 
discretion is at the core of corporate governance. 
The paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 
discusses the theoretical origin of managerial 
discretion by reviewing relevant corporate governance 
and economic literature. Section 3 reviews the 
empirical studies and discuss the empirical finding on 
managerial discretion on several organisational 
outcomes. Section 4 clarifies the importance of 
the concept of managerial discretion by articulating 
the implication of internal corporate governance 
mechanisms on managerial power and top executives‟ 
discretion. Section 5 conclusion the paper with 
discussions on the limitations of this study and 
further avenues of research. 
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2.  MANAGERIAL DISCRETION: THE THEORETICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
Before responding to the arguments presented in 
Andersen (2019), it is important to show the 
theoretical classification of managerial discretion. 
Theories in corporate governance and transaction 
cost economics (Fama, 1990; Williamson, 1981, 
1991, 2010) assume managers as opportunistic 
agents. The main aim of such theories is to find 
ways in which they can control the opportunistic 
behaviour of managers. In this perspective, 
the concept of managerial discretion provides 
greater possibilities for managers to engage in 
opportunistic behaviour without fully attending to 
the needs and expectations of shareholders. 
Findings show that when managers particularly 
executives are given more discretion, they are more 
likely to use it for their own benefit and as such 
engage in opportunistic behaviour as opposed to 
using it in the interest of their firms. For instance, 
studies have shown how managers with greater 
discretion may engage in unjustified selling of assets 
(Lang, Poulsen, & Stulz, 1995), risky unrelated 
diversification as a method of strategic growth (Tosi 
& Gomez-Mejia, 1989), overpricing the portion of 
abnormal accruals (Xie, 2001), and boosting bonus 
pool allocation (Bailey, Hecht, & Towry, 2011). 
From a corporate governance perspective, such 
opportunistic behaviour lead to increased agency 
cost, which will ultimately affect shareholders, and 
from a transaction cost economics, it increases 
the economic cost of transactions. 
The dilemma arises from the strategic 
management scholars‟ view on top executives. In 
this realm, top executives are important and critical 
decision-makers whose actions and choices have 
a significant impact on their organisations‟ fate and 
form (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). The principal 
argument is that executives who possess greater 
degrees of managerial discretion have a greater 
influence on organisational outcomes as opposed to 
their counterparts who possess a low degree of 
managerial discretion. Studies within the strategic 
management field show that when executives are 
accorded greater discretion, regardless of the source 
of such discretion, they may well engage in 
the development of their organisations through 
pursuing diversification strategy (Misangyi, 2002), 
which in turn provides greater strategic flexibility 
and spread the risk to allow for a quicker 
compensation of demand fluctuations in different 
task domains (Pehrsson, 2006). Furthermore, giving 
executives greater discretion would enable them to 
foresee more strategic actions such as entering  
new markets (Kim & Kim, 2013), initiating strategic 
change to allow for greater adaptability to  
changes in the external environment (Quigley & 
Hambrick, 2012), and engage in export-based 
internationalisation (Sahaym, Treviño, & Steensma, 
2012). The principal objective in this research 
stream is to understand what hinders or permits 
executives to exercise their strategic agenda 
(Wangrow et al., 2015). Therefore, to a great extent, 
the strategic management perspective of managerial 
discretion adopts the view that these choices are 
in-line with organisational objectives. 
The above perspectives have discussed 
managerial discretion in different ways, on the one 
hand, the corporate governance and economics 
literature focuses on describing the freedom 
executives can have in pursuing personal goals 
rather than maximising shareholders‟ return and 
firm performance. In high discretion settings, 
executives are more able to pursue individual 
objectives without actually getting held or punished. 
In low discretion settings executives are faced with 
significant pressures to focus on maximising 
shareholders‟ value and firm performance, and 
failure to do so will lead to punishment at 
the executive own cost. Despite recent findings that 
show a higher probability of CEO dismissal when 
firm performance is poor in high discretionary 
contexts (Crossland & Chen, 2013), this cannot 
directly explain if those CEOs have been caught 
engaging in opportunistic behaviour and as such 
have been punished by dismissal. Agency theorists 
(Walsh & Ellwood, 1991) argue that because 
executives are responsible for firm performance, 
they should inevitably be dismissed when 
performance becomes poor as this may well increase 
shareholders‟ wealth (Denis & Denis, 1995; Worrell, 
Davidson, & Glascock, 1993). However, such 
a perspective does not clearly suggest whether 
executives actively seek to engage in opportunistic 
behaviour and as a result, they face dismissal, 
instead, the governance mechanisms at the 
corporate level can have a significant impact on 
the occurrence of such turnover during the poor 
performance (Denis & Serrano, 1996). Additionally, 
some propose that executives‟ turnover or dismissal 
in poor firm performance is not but a ceremonial 
accusation or “ritual scapegoating” (Gamson & 
Scotch, 1964). This perspective suggests because of 
the internal and external forces that constraints 
organisations, executives are believed to have very 
little impact on organisational outcomes. The 
attribution of organisational performance to 
executives is nothing but a matter of observers 
romanticising leadership (Meindl & Lerner, 1984).  
On the other hand, management and strategic 
management literature treat discretion as to 
the latitude of executive strategic actions and was 
introduced in a way to explain the effect executives 
can have over organisational outcomes (Finkelstein & 
Boyd, 1998; Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987). 
Executives in low discretion conditions are bounded 
by different constraints, with a very narrow array of 
strategic actions to choose from and as such are 
less likely to have a significant influence on their 
organisational outcomes. Whereas, in high 
discretionary contexts, executives enjoy greater 
freedom in decision making and are able to choose 
from a wider array of strategic choices, which will 
ultimately be reflected in organisational outcomes. 
Following the latter literature, several studies have 
shown the different antecedents and consequences 
of managerial discretion. In terms of antecedents, 
research shows that executives operating within 
the same domain can foresee distinct sets of  
actions depending on their individualities and 
psychological characteristics (Wangrow et al., 2015). 
Some executives have the ability to envision a wider 
range of alternatives and to create multiple courses 
of action that affect organisational outcomes. These 
psychological micro-foundations are unique features 
that determine executives‟ discretion. For example, 
executives with a greater locus of control (Carpenter 
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& Golden, 1997), ambiguity tolerance (Dollinger, 
Golden, & Saxton, 1997), networking relationships 
(Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997), risk-taking 
behaviour (Roth, 1992), and low commitment to 
the status quo (McClelland, Liang, & Barker, 2010) 
possess a higher degree of discretion. Moreover, 
firms with abundant resources that are easily 
transferable enable executives to foresee change and 
choose from a wider variety of alternatives 
(Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Similarly, the lack of 
ingrained culture and the existence of a passive 
board accord executives with a greater degree of 
discretion (Boyd & Salamin, 2001). Relatedly, CEO 
duality increases the likelihood of strategic change, 
which in turn enhances managerial discretion (Kim & 
Kim, 2013; Quigley & Hambrick, 2012). In contrast, 
organisations with an entrenched rigid culture and 
control place strict constraints on executives‟ 
actions and limit strategic change initiatives (Key, 
2002; Wangrow et al., 2015). Also, some industries 
can afford a greater variety of choices/actions than 
others. Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) argue that 
advertising, R&D intensity, and market growth 
promote managerial discretion. However, industry 
regulation constrains executives‟ latitude of actions 
(Peteraf & Reed, 2007). Similarly, Finkelstein (2009) 
finds that both demand variability and industry 
concentration negatively affect CEOs‟ discretion. 
Recent endeavours have broadened the milieu in 
which discretion emanates. Crossland and  
Hambrick (2011) assert that culture significantly 
shapes the degree of managerial discretion. They 
demonstrate that discretion is the primary instrument 
through which national culture sways CEOs‟ influence 
on firm performance. Similarly, Haj Youssef and 
Christodoulou (2017b), assumed greater homogeneity 
within a particular cultural context (Arabic countries) 
and investigated the generalisability of the cultural 
dimension of managerial discretion, and introduced 
new national-level antecedents. However, this  
later has been taken into consideration by 
emphasising the importance of intra-cultural variation 
(Haj Youssef & Christodoulou, 2018). 
In relation to outcomes of managerial discretion, 
the majority of work in this field of research has 
examined the various consequences of managerial 
discretion, from the individual (e.g., for CEO 
risk-taking behavior, see Miller et al., 1982; for 
compensation, see Rajagopalan and Finkelstein, 1992; 
Baixauli-Soler, Lozano-Reina, and Sánchez-Marín, 
2020), organization (e.g., for strategic change, see 
Quigley and Hambrick, 2012; for performance, see 
Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2009; Von Lilienfeld-Toal 
and Ruenzi, 2014; Sirén, Patel, Örtqvist, and Wincent, 
2018; Yan, Chong, and Mak, 2010; for CSR, see Gupta, 
Nadkarni, and Mariam, 2019; for HRM practice, see 
López-Cotarelo, 2018; for internationalisation 
option, see Sahaym, Treviño, and Steensma, 2012; 
for organisational structure and forms, see 
Pazzaglia, 2010; Sandhu and Kulik, 2019), industry 
(e.g., for attentional homogeneity, see Abrahamson 
and Hambrick, 1997; for competition, see Ball, Shah, 
and Wowak, 2018; for capital structure, see 
Andrikopoulos, 2009), and even the national 
level (e.g., for CEO influence on firm performance, 
see Crossland and Hambrick, 2011; for CEO 
accountability, see Crossland and Chen, 2013; for 
country competitiveness, see Haj Youssef et al., 2019). 
However, no study has examined whether discretion 
is a desirable construct for better performance, 
except for Haj Youssef et al. (2019). 
Andersen (2019) debates that the discretion 
concept is intangible and a “black box”, while such 
arguments are very catchy, they do not describe 
the actual state of discretion literature. All these 
claims appear to be in-line with each other, or in 
other words, the same. Being intangible and a “black 
box” has nothing to do with its theoretical 
definition, instead, these arguments should be 
presented in the empirical part. Haj Youssef and 
Christodoulou (2017b) argue that from a technical 
aspect, directly operationalizing managerial 
discretion is challenging because prior studies solely 
focused on using proxy measures. This is what 
makes discretion from a measurement standpoint, 
an intangible and a “black box” concept. Therefore, 
such claims are rejected. Andersen (2019) claiming 
that the discretion concept is not entirely knowable 
is not an accurate assessment of the theoretical lens 
of this concept. Instead of arguing that the concept 
is not entirely knowable, scholars should highlight 
what is missing in the discretion literature that will 
enhance our understanding of this concept in 
particular it is a contribution to the corporate 
governance field. Very little work in the discretion 
literature has adopted the economist perspective 
and investigated whether according greater degree 
of discretion to executives‟ triggers opportunistic 
behaviour. As mentioned earlier, the economics 
literature is concerned with the incentives that 
executives can have when accorded a greater degree 
of discretion, as in such situations, executives may 
take decisions that satisfy their own interest rather 
than maximize shareholder value. Remarkably 
enough, Williamson (1963) who is amongst the first 
authors to discuss the concept of managerial 
discretion is heavily bypassed in the discretion 
literature from a management perspective. He 
introduced discretion to describe the degree of 
freedom that a manager can have in pursuing 
personal goals in different areas: pay, power, 
prestige, and status. To bridge these two polar 
views, Shen and Cho (2005) introduced the concept 
of the latitude of objectives and latitude of actions 
to correspond to the central ideas being discussed in 
each of the above literature. They used latitude of 
objectives to complement the discussion in 
the economics literature and latitude of actions 
totally with the management literature. Such 
an integrative approach is very important to match 
different literature and enhance the understanding 
of a particular concept. However, it is almost 
impossible to disentangle the latitude of objectives 
from the latitude of actions when discussing 
managerial discretion, which was the case in 
the majority of work in the discretion field. Both 
latitudes describe the freedom of choice, or in other 
words, the availability of options available to 
executives. In contexts that provide greater latitude 
of actions, managers‟ probability in engaging in 
opportunistic behaviour, the latitude of objectives, is 
significantly increased. Also, in contexts where 
managers are accorded greater latitude of objectives 
may or may not take advantage of the situation and 
take the decision to serve their own interest at 
the expense of other stakeholders. Thus, both 
dimensions of discretion are well interconnected 
and cannot be divided. Again, reemphasizing 
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the theoretical importance of managerial discretion 
not only in the strategic management literature but 
also in the corporate governance field. The above 
discussion shows that instead of arguing that 
discretion does not provide any advances to 
research in corporate governance (Andersen, 2019), 
scholars are encouraged to focus on understanding 
when executives do engage in opportunistic 
behaviour, which will ultimately provide an additional 
explanation of the rationale behind incorporating 
discretion within corporate governance work. 
 
3. MANAGERIAL DISCRETION: THE EMPIRICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) provided industry 
analysts‟ rating of managerial discretion and were 
the first to introduce such a direct empirical 
measure of discretion. Andersen (2019) argues to 
date there is no researcher that provided 
an empirical definition of discretion, including 
Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995). However, 
Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) established 
a measure of the overall amount of discretion in 
a diverse set of industries by relying on panellist 
ratings. Panellists provide reliable and valid 
assessments of business strategies (Snow & 
Hambrick, 1980). An expert panel possesses 
the advantage of rating discretion itself directly and 
more closely than other measures. Additionally, 
the use of an expert panel provides scores with 
a minimum bias compared to CEOs for instance, and 
these panellists possess better knowledge in 
multiple contexts due to their exposure to several 
environments, and most importantly the relative 
objectivity of their answers (Hambrick & 
Abrahamson, 1995; Crossland & Hambrick, 2011). 
Similarly, Crossland and Hambrick (2011) and 
Haj Youssef and Christodoulou (2018) provided 
direct operationalisation techniques by relying on 
a panel of experts (international fund managers and 
professional management consultants). By doing so 
researchers are reaching consistency in the 
measurements (Boyd & Gove, 2006). Andersen (2019) 
relied on Carpenter and Golden (1997) who 
measured managerial discretion by relying on 
a questionnaire addressed to executives to argue 
that this makes discretion a subjective variable. 
While perceived discretion is indeed a subjective 
variable as it depends on the individual executive 
characteristics, Andersen (2019) avoided discussing 
the direct measures presented by Hambrick and 
Abrahamson (1995), Crossland and Hambrick (2011) 
and Haj Youssef and Christodoulou (2018), which 
clearly relied on an objective perspective. 
The rationale behind using expert panels as 
discussed above relates to the consideration of 
the context in conceptual terms, thus using 
minimum bias; wide exposure of the panellists 
which allows reasoned comparison in the rating; and 
most importantly providing objective measures. It is 
well documented that if asking an individual to  
self-rate themselves will provide biased responses 
and instead, it is better to ask others to rate 
individuals in order to maintain the objectivity 
element (Fisher, 2006). In this case, respondents 
become observers of others and accordingly will 
provide a more accurate and objective rating, which is 
the case when using industry analysts, international 
fund managers, scholars, and management 
consultants to rate the discretion of executives in 
a given context. Furthermore, Andersen (2019) relied 
on Hambrick and Finkelstein‟s (1987) statement 
about the individual dimension of managerial 
discretion that the degree to which executives are 
able to envision multiple courses of actions is still 
not measured. Envision is simply another word of 
perceiving, therefore what Hambrick and Finkelstein 
(1987) meant was perceived discretion, which was 
clearly empirically measured by Carpenter and 
Golden (1997) in Andersen‟s (2019) own words: “So 
far, there have been no logical arguments or any 
empirical studies supporting the notion that 
managerial discretion has any significant effect on 
organisational goal-attainment” (p. 197). Surprisingly 
enough the variance in firm performance 
attributable to the individual CEO has significantly 
increased over the last decades reaching levels as 
high as 26%, much more than the organization, 
industry, and year effects (Quigley & Hambrick, 
2015). Managerial discretion the primary mechanism 
by which executives are able to place their own 
distinctive marks on the company fate and form 
proves otherwise. Also, CEOs in high discretionary 
contexts are paid more than their counterparts in 
low discretionary environments and are much more 
vulnerable to dismissal (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; 
Crossland & Chen, 2013). Therefore, claiming that 
discretion has no significant effect on firm goal 
attainment is another misleading statement. 
 
4. REINSTATING THE ORIGINAL POSITION 
 
Haj Youssef and Teng (2019) state that the separation 
of ownership and control leads managers to 
discover themselves with discretionary control over 
the funds that shareholders have invested. Though 
the investors and managers can sign a contract that 
specifies what managers do with the funds and how 
the returns are divided between managers and 
investors, most contingencies are difficult to 
predicate. Therefore, it is the impracticality of 
drawing a full-specified contract. Corporate 
governance literature stems from the divergence of 
interests and misalignment of incentives between 
the principals and the agents and addresses that 
the top management team has discretion in 
deploying shareholder‟s wealth because the 
incomplete contract can hardly regulate the top 
managers‟ opportunistic behaviour. The essential 
aim of good corporate governance is to minimize 
the agency problem and associated costs by 
restraining managerial discretionary accruals and 
ensuring the managers are working in line with 
the shareholder‟s best interests. 
Managerial discretion refers to the latitude of 
options/objectives the top management team has in 
making strategic choices (Crossland & Hambrick, 
2011; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Managerial 
discretion becomes irrelevant and unimportant only 
under the circumstance where the managers‟ interests 
are thoroughly aligned with the shareholder  
and/or regulated by a complete and sophisticated 
contract. Unfortunately, both circumstances are 
technically impossible or at least very costly to fulfil. 
The agency perspective suggests that managers can 
take advantage of the information asymmetry over 
the shareholders and engage in opportunistic 
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behaviour at the cost of the shareholders‟ interests. 
Therefore, a number of corporate governance 
mechanisms have been implemented to either align 
the management interests with the shareholders or 
generate effective monitoring to discipline the 
management. The incentive alignment function is 
fulfilled through incentive payment. The monitoring 
mechanisms include the board of directors and 
ownership concentration. While the monitoring 
mechanisms focus on controlling managerial 
behaviour by restraining managerial discretion and 
decision-making autonomy, the incentive mechanisms 
impose control through aligning the divergent 
incentives of the management and the shareholders. 
Incentive payment. One potential solution to 
the agency problem is incentive payment. Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997) suggest that incentive payment 
provides managers with “a highly contingent, long 
term incentive contract ex-ante to align his/her 
interests with those of investors” (p. 744). Incentive 
payment restrains self-interested opportunism and 
motivates the management to discharge their duty 
with a focus on the best interests of shareholders. 
It is considered that such contracts co-align 
the preferences of agents with those of the principal 
because the rewards for both depend on the same 
actions and, therefore, the conflicts of self-interest 
between principal and agent are reduced.  
Incentive payment relates to managerial 
discretion in two ways. First, incentive payment 
generates the pay-performance sensitivity where 
shareholders‟ interests are furthered through crafting 
executive pay arrangements. Thus, an incentive-based 
compensation policy motivates the manager to 
select and implement actions that increase 
shareholder wealth. In other words, incentive 
payment minimizes monitoring costs incurred by 
board directors and ensures that executives will not 
take advantage of their managerial discretion to 
shirk their duty towards a firm‟s shareholders 
(Magnan & Stonge, 1997).  
Second, incentive payment and the general 
compensation package also reflect the managerial 
power because managers may use their influence 
within the firm to influence their own level of 
compensation (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Bebchuk, 
Fried, & Walker, 2002). Empirical studies have shown 
that higher discretion yields greater CEO 
compensation (Finkelstein, 2009; Finkelstein & Boyd, 
1998; Rajagopalan & Finkelstein, 1992). Roth and 
O‟Donnell (1996) examine 100 foreign subsidiaries 
in 5 countries and find that foreign subsidiaries with 
higher discretion tend to have a higher degree of 
incentive pay. Harris and Bromiley (2007) find that 
incentive payment is more like to trigger accounting 
misconduct in the U.S. between 2002 and 2003. 
Von Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi (2014) indicate that 
in firms where managerial discretion is high, 
managerial ownership, as incentive payment, delivers 
large positive abnormal returns. 
Board of directors. Board monitoring has been 
centrally important in corporate governance. Boards 
represent an organisation‟s owners and are granted 
formal authority to ratify management initiatives; 
evaluate managerial performance, and hence to 
award and penalise management on the basis of 
criteria that are set in favour of shareholders‟ 
interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Thus, the board is 
responsible for adopting control mechanisms to 
ensure that management‟s behaviour and actions  
are consistent with the interests of the owners. 
An effective board of directors can eliminate agency 
cost and limit managerial discretion by mitigating 
self-serving behaviour by managers and ensuring 
that a firm‟s management formulates appropriate 
strategies and hence improving performance (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983). Existing managerial discretion 
research views the governance roles of the board and 
focuses on the effects of board independence and 
CEO duality on the level of managerial discretion. 
Agency theorists suggest that CEO duality would 
reduce the board‟s effectiveness as a monitoring 
mechanism and enhance managerial discretion 
(Finkelstein & D‟aveni, 1994). In addition, vigilant 
boards should be composed of more independent 
outsiders to control managerial behaviour.  
Empirically, Finkelstein and D‟aveni (1994) find 
that CEOs who also hold the board chairperson 
position at the same time have greater discretion 
compared to CEOs who are not holding the chairman 
position. Kim and Kim (2013) use CEO duality as 
a measure of managerial discretion and examine 
the link between CEO duality and market entry. 
Baliga, Moyer, and Rao (1996) address the duality 
structure may cause the abuse of managerial 
discretion. Maug (1997) emphasizes the important 
function of independent directors to restrain 
managerial discretion through contract negotiation. 
In more recent studies, Miller (2011) finds that more 
stringent corporate governance (e.g. more 
independent board structure and separated CEO and 
Chairman) mitigates costs of managerial discretion 
in publicly-traded insurance companies. Cheung, 
Naidu, Navissi, and Ranjeeni (2017) argue that board 
monitoring intensity and board independence can 
curb managerial discretion and managers‟ rent-
seeking incentives. Ponomareva (2019) suggests that 
board monitoring is a counterbalance of managerial 
discretion and demonstrates that managerial 
discretion is a useful tool to explain the balance 
between controlling and enabling managerial 
decision making. 
In addition to the monitoring function, 
researchers have also suggested alternative views 
about the role of the board based on stakeholder 
theory. Stakeholder theory recognises that corporate 
governance practices are influenced by a wider set  
of firm-related actors and their interactions (Freeman, 
1984). Stakeholder theory shifts attention from 
the monitoring function of the board toward 
the multiple objectives of different constituent firm‟s 
stakeholders. For example, corporate governance 
researchers have reviewed the board of directors‟ 
resource role (Filatotchev, 2006; Zahra & Filatotchev, 
2004) and suggested that boards can extend their 
involvement to the provision of ongoing advice and 
expertise to the firm (Teng, Li, & Tanna, 2021). 
Ownership concentration. Large blockholders 
may be effective actors in controlling the agency 
problems caused by the separation of investments 
and “decision-making functions” in firms and 
restraining managerial discretion (Gedajlovic & 
Shapiro, 1998; Tihanyi, Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 
2003). Blockholders can gather a substantial portion 
of the gains from the improvement of firm 
performance. They, therefore, have stronger 
incentives to monitor management closely (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Blockholders usually have their 
representatives sit on the board of directors, so they 
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can influence managerial decisions and intervene in 
the firm‟s operation directly (Grossman & Hart, 
1982). Hambrick and Finkelstein (1995) asserted that 
a concentrated ownership structure is associated 
with a lower degree of managerial discretion when 
compared with a dispersed ownership structure. 
Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) suggest that 
a concentrated ownership structure can be viewed as 
a mechanism to limit managerial discretion through 
increased control and monitoring of managerial 
decisions. 
Apart from the internal corporate governance 
mechanisms listed above, extant corporate 
governance literature also explores the effects of 
external mechanisms on managerial discretion. For 
example, one aspect explores the influence of 
managerial discretion on accounting standards and 
information disclose. Nelson, Elliot, and Tarpley 
(2002) suggest that top manager may use their 
discretion to choose specific accounting standards. 
Keegan and Kabanoff (2008) find that a higher level 
of managerial discretion relates to a wider choice of 
the focal firm‟s accounting standard. 
Another aspect examines the relationship 
between the market for corporate control and 
managerial discretion. The market for corporate 
control can be seen as a substitute for internal 
corporate governance based on direct monitoring by 
large blockholders who possess substantial control 
rights and interest alignment payment. Because 
there is a strong relationship between share prices 
and managerial performance, lower share prices 
urge shareholders to exit from the poorly performed 
firm, which, in turn, create incentives for outsiders 
to accumulate control rights, replace the 
management, and restructure the firm (Filatotchev, 
Jackson, Gospel, & Allcock, 2007). For example, Kim, 
Sambharya, and Yang (2016) examine the role of 
CEOs exercising managerial discretion in their effort 
to prevent their corporate demise and find CEOs cut 
discretionary expenses such as research and 
development, advertising, and rent to boost earnings 
and enhance financial performance. 
Andersen (2017, 2019) argues corporate 
governance scholarship should be better off if 
the concept of managerial discretion can be 
abandoned. Haj Youssef and Teng (2019) disagrees 
with his conclusion because “the more discretion 
managers are authorized to exercise, the greater the 
potential for the managers to operate in their own 
self-interest at the expense of the firm‟s other claim 
holders” (Mayers & Smith, 1994, p. 640). The aim of 
corporate governance has concentrated primarily 
on the effectiveness of corporate control, stressing 
the minimization of agency costs and managerial 
opportunism (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The 
argument for imposing control over managerial 
discretion is illustrated by an extensive body of 
research discussed above. Therefore, we argue 
against Andersen (2017, 2019) and assert corporate 
governance research can not afford to abandon 





This paper has re-emphasized the importance of 
managerial discretion in corporate governance 
research. We have reviewed both theoretical research 
and empirical studies on this topic. We presented 
convincing evidence to show that there are several 
empirical works conducted to directly measure 
the concept of managerial discretion. Andersen 
(2017, 2019) proposes that we should abandon 
managerial discretion research because there are 
limitations in measuring it. We admit that extant 
empirical research may have limitations, just like 
many others, if not all social science studies. Does it 
mean, however, we should abandon this key concept 
of corporate governance? Our response is “No”.  
As scholars, our job is to discover the unknown  
and unclarified knowledge, rather than abandon 
important concept which we are yet to explore  
fully. Furthermore, do we have a universally  
agreed definition and accurate measurement of 
“performance”? Do we have an accurate measure of 
“sustainability” and many other subjective items  
(e.g., job satisfaction)? If not, do we have to abandon 
all of these as well? Calling to abandon the concept 
of managerial discretion in corporate governance 
research is a clear indication that scholars in this 
field are not able to disentangle these two concepts. 
Therefore, we still strongly believe that corporate 
governance and managerial discretion are closely 
related. We encourage scholars to present additional 
attention to understanding the different mechanisms 
in which these constructs interact. 
This paper highlights the importance of 
managerial discretion in corporate governance 
research, which provides promising avenues for 
future research. Recent research has addressed 
the importance of managerial discretion in corporate 
governance and explored its effects on corporate 
governance and firm performance. Prior studies 
have examined the impacts of managerial discretion 
on executive payment and leadership structure 
(Carpenter & Sanders, 2002; Finkelstein & Boyd, 
1998). The question of whether managerial 
discretion has positive or negative impacts on 
performance outcomes remains debated. Wangrow 
et al. (2015) urge managerial discretion scholars to 
further examine the complementary vs substitute 
effects of managerial discretion on corporate 
governance mechanisms. In specific, they suggest 
corporate governance scholars further examine 
the interplay between managerial discretion and 
corporate governance mechanisms. Internal 
corporate governance mechanisms may be more 
necessary and beneficial when managerial discretion 
is high. By contrast, closely monitor managerial 
behaviour may be unnecessary when managerial 
discretion is limited. 
Furthermore, the mixed and inconclusive finding 
of the managerial discretion and performance link 
may be derived from the theoretical base of 
the stewardship theory versus agency theory. 
One critical question that requires further 
investigation is that under what circumstances 
the top management team is more likely to serve as 
the steward or self-interested agent. We need to 
examine both external factors and internal 
organisational settings to understand when and 
where managerial discretion is beneficial for 
the firm‟s outcomes. Agency theorists have generally 
related managerial discretion with opportunistic 
behaviour. Thus, exploring under what circumstances 
managerial discretion plays a beneficial role in 
influencing performance has an interesting 
implication for the organisation. 
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Existing studies have investigated the macro 
effects of the institutional environment on 
managerial discretion diversity (Crossland & 
Hambrick, 2011; Wang, DeGhtto, Ellen, & Lamont, 
2019) and the interrelationship between managerial 
discretion and corporate governance. This line of 
research highlights how managerial discretion is 
regulated under varying institutional settings and 
corporate governance regimes. However, a limited 
amount of research had examined how micro-level 
managerial characteristics influence the perception 
of the external situations and governance system, 
which in turn, enhance or reduce executives‟ 
perceived level of discretion (Wangrow et al., 2015). 
Important insights can be gained by investigating 
managerial human capital, social capital, and 
psychological capital and see how these 
characteristics enable executives to make decisions 
under a given macro environment and corporate 
governance system. What we are suggesting is that 
the relationship between managerial discretion and 
corporate governance should not be a one-way path 
(i.e., effectiveness and quality of corporate 
governance would shape levels of managerial 
discretion), rather managerial characteristics 
(especially human capital, social capital, and 
psychological capital) may act as counter forces and 
shape corporate governance practices. Recent 
corporate governance research has devoted 
attention to the distinct contexts in which firms are 
embedded (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Aguilera, 
Judge, & Terjesen, 2018). By criticising agency theory 
under contextualised nature, institutional theorists 
explain the diversity of corporate governance 
arrangements across different institutional contexts, 
suggesting that corporate governance may be 
exogenously determined by organisational 
environments. Therefore, research on managerial 
discretion could greatly benefit from a theoretical 
discussion on how do institutions create diverse 
corporate governance behaviours? Consequently, 
how do these corporate governance practices 
enhance or diminish managerial discretion? 
Extant research explores the effects of 
managerial discretion on firm performance 
variability, managerial action, and corporate 
governance among established firms. Absent from 
research, however, is the level of discretion that top 
managers, especially the firm‟s founder within 
an initial public offering (IPO) firm perceive. 
The founder, as the firm‟s creator and legal owner, 
has a profound influence on a firm‟s strategy and 
performance in the early stage of the firm‟s life cycle 
(Teng & Li, 2020; Teng et al., 2021). IPO is probably 
the most important stage in the evolution of a public 
company. An entrepreneurial firm has to adjust its 
organisational structure and corporate governance 
to accommodate the changed ownership structure 
and different stakeholders‟ interests after the 
flotation. The founder who used to serve as 
the leader and chief executive may still serve as 
the CEO after the IPO. It has important implication 
to examine how the corporate governance may 
restrain the managerial discretion of the founder 
and how the founder challenges the various new 
stakeholder of the newly listed firm and ensure 
his/her voice on the firm‟s decision-making. 
The above proposed managerial discretion 
research has important theoretical and practical 
implications. Since Hambrick and Mason‟s (1984) 
seminal paper on “upper echelons‟, the question 
“does top management team matter” can be hardly 
controversial. Managerial discretion, as the latitude 
of managerial actions, is delegated by the 
shareholders and varies across external and internal 
organizational environments. It is important to 
explore the effectiveness of the delegation and 
examine to what extent and under what 
circumstances top management influences corporate 
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